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I. INTRODUCTION

Once again, I will address the issue of litigation settlements
between companies that hold patents on pharmaceutical products (sometimes "pioneers") and would-be generic entrants ("generics") who challenge the validity of the patent and/or a claim of infringement.1 In my
two earlier papers, I discussed various aspects of those settlements and
acknowledged some evolution in views with progressively deeper immersion in the subject. This paper will focus on one subject which has
been the focus of a particularly lively debate, namely, the legality of
those settlements in which the generic agrees to defer entry for a period
of time in return for the pioneer's monetary payment. A payment of this
kind is sometimes called a "reverse payment" to distinguish it from more
familiar settlements that involve the payment of a royalty to the patentee.
In my second paper, published in 2001, I concluded that reverse
payments raised serious legal issues. Two years later, in In re ScheringPlough Corp.,2 the Commission unanimously held that respondent Schering-Plough Corporation's two reverse payment settlements violated § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The debate continues, however,
because judicial reaction to the opinion has been somewhat less than
t Member of the D.C. Bar. The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my
former colleagues in the Federal Trade Commission (the Commission) or of my colleagues in, or
clients of, my present law firm. It would not surprise me if some of the above strongly disagree; this
is a tough subject.
1. See also Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent
Disputes, Part 11, 34 AHLA J. HEALTH L. 657 (Fall 2001); Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes,
Address at Northwestern University School of Law: Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum
(Nov. 3, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1738405 (F.T.C.).
2. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003),
vacated, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2929 (2006).
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enthusiastic. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
Commission summarily, 3 and the Supreme Court declined to hear the
case. 4 In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted
summary judgment against private plaintiffs in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation,5 a case predicated on the theory that a similar settlement violated the antitrust laws. As detailed below, both the majority
and dissent in Tamoxifen analyzed the legality of reverse payments in
ways fundamentally different from the Commission's approach in
Schering.
In light of these opinions (and others), it is appropriate to go back to
square one and once more highlight the basic policy issues that these
cases present. This discussion will focus on the Tamoxifen opinion, with
passing reference to other decisions. Obviously, reasonable people can
disagree on these issues, but I still believe the Commission's approach in
Schering was correct.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA

The old adage that "hard cases make bad law" may or may not be
true, but "hard cases" are surely hard to decide. The fundamental problem in this particular set of cases is that there are two apparently
compelling lines of argument that point in opposing directions.
The first line of argument flows from the exclusionary rights conferred by a patent; the presumptive validity of patents; the strong judicial
policy in favor of settlements; and the consequent conclusion that any
settlement which permits generic entry on or before patent expiration
cannot be anticompetitive, even if it provides for a reverse payment.
The second line of argument flows from the fact that Congress has
passed a statute specifically designed to facilitate earlier entry by generic
competition, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 6 This statute
provides specific incentives for both patentees and challengers designed
to encourage litigation to a conclusion, and because of the special
economic dynamics of the pharmaceutical market, reverse payment settlements will defeat the objectives of the statute.

3. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058.
4. 126 S.Ct. 2929 (2006).
5. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98

Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).

2007]

PharmaceuticalPatentDisputes
A. Application of the FirstLine ofArgument in Tamoxifen

A patentee has an absolute right to bar competition from any products that infringe its patent, and a patent is presumptively valid absent
clear and convincing proof to the contrary. If it ultimately turns out that a
patent is indeed valid and infringed, it is hard to see how consumers can
be harmed by any settlement that provides for generic entry before the
patent expiration date, regardless of whether the settlement contains a
reverse payment. Consumers cannot complain simply because the
patentee has chosen to share some of the "monopoly" profits7 with a
potential challenger in the settlement. In these circumstances, it is not
appropriate to speculate on whether consumers might have been even
better off if the settlement had been structured in a different way. The
straightforward simplicity of the argument, coupled with judicial preference for settlements, has obvious appeal.
For these reasons, the ultimate conclusion of the Tamoxifen majority may well be correct; it was appropriate to dismiss the complaint. It
appears from the face of the opinion that patent validity, not infringement, was the determinative issue in the patent case that had been settled.
In the period between the settlement and the Second Circuit opinion, the
validity of the patent had apparently been upheld in three separate
lawsuits. 8
However, one apparent problem is that, generally, the antitrust validity of a settlement agreement should be determined as of the date on
which the agreement was signed, rather than the date the antitrust case is
decided (or even the date the record in the antitrust case is closed). 9 In
Tamoxifen, the only available judicial precedent was a lower court opinion that held the patent at issue invalid.' ° This apparent problem is not all
that serious in the context of a private suit for damages. Even if it were
assumed that the original settlement had been illegal, subsequent events
could undercut a damage claim. Subsequent events do not transform an
illegal agreement into a legal one; they just break the chain of causation
between the illegal act and the market consequences. There are similar
examples in other areas of antitrust. One example is a price fixing
agreement, which is illegal per se. Such an agreement does not give rise
to a damage claim if the parties thereafter have ignored it. Perhaps a
somewhat closer analogy is a per se illegal agreement not to compete
7. The term "monopoly" is used here simply to refer to the patentee's monopoly over its patented product. The shorthand expression does not signify that the patentee has monopoly power in a
relevant market. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
8. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194-95.
9. Id. at 204.
10. Id.
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after some future date. Such an agreement would not cause damage if the
party that gives the promise is barred from entry for other reasonsperhaps an import barrier-before the restriction becomes effective.
Assume, however, that an antitrust prosecutor, not a damage claimant, must assess the antitrust legality of a settlement before the merits of
the underlying patent case have been resolved, and infringement is also
an issue. The Commission confronted this situation in Schering and in a
number of other cases that have been resolved by consent decrees. " For
reasons explained below, it is also a situation that continues to confront
the Commission. What then?
B. Application of the Second Line ofArgument
in the Commission 's Schering Opinion
The line of argument that induced the Commission to take an adverse view of reverse payments in the Schering opinion may be restated
as follows. In the Hatch-Waxman Act, 2 Congress created a number of
special incentives and rewards, in aid of an overarching objective of
speeding generic entry without chilling innovation. To analyze these
special features and their effects on the dynamics of settlement, it is
necessary first to summarize some salient features of the Act.
The complex Hatch-Waxman provisions are outlined in many opinions, including the Commission's opinion in Schering. For purposes of
this discussion, the most significant elements begin with a process that
enables a would-be generic competitor to get prompt FDA approval of its
drug so long as it certifies that-for various alternative reasons-its sales
will not infringe on a pioneer manufacturer's patent rights.' 3 The most
common certification (a "paragraph IV" certification) declares either that
the pioneer's patent is invalid or that the generic would not infringe. 14 A
generic that
selects this form of certification must notify each affected
5
patentee.

If no patentee brings an infringement action within forty-five days,
the generic may get immediate FDA approval and start to sell its product. 16 If, however, a patentee brings an infringement action within this
11. See, e.g., In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2001 FTC LEXIS 56 (F.T.C. May

8, 2001). In fact, in the Schering case itself, respondent American Home Products Corporation
agreed to a final consent order. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at
*19 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003).
12. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
13. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
14. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vi)(IV).

15. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
16. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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period, the patentee is entitled to an automatic stay for a period that is
likely to last up to thirty months.' 7 It will terminate earlier if there is a

judicial decision on the merits of the action.' 8 As a result, pioneers effectively receive an automatic preliminary injunction, and generics receive
the opportunity to litigate patent issues before they have actually entered
the market and incurred crushing damage exposure. As an added incentive, the FDA rules give the first generic challenger the right to market a
generic product exclusively for 180 days.' 9 This incentive can also benefit the pioneer because other generic challengers are not allowed to enter
the market until 180 days after the first challenger enters.
Because of the particular dynamics of competition between pioneers and generics in the pharmaceutical industry, these special incentives have consequences that may not be immediately obvious. It is now
generally recognized that the total profits available to the pioneer in the
absence of generic entry exceed the total profits of both the pioneer and
the generic after generic entry. 20 Thus, a pioneer can afford to "buy off' a
generic challenger by a settlement under which the generic delays entry.
In return for the generic's delayed entry, the pioneer pays the generic an
amount equal to, or in excess of, the profit the generic could expect to
earn if it entered earlier. Therefore, the generic has a powerful incentive
to use the Hatch-Waxman process to speed approval of its drug and embark on the first patent challenge, but it has no incentive whatsoever to
pursue litigation to the end. In fact, when reverse payments are allowed,
the generic may obtain more by settlement than it could have obtained by
outright victory in the patent case. This fact alone distinguishes HatchWaxman settlements from settlements outside the ambit of the statute.
The pioneer patentee also has a strong incentive to settle, but for
different reasons. The pioneer will make considerably more money over
the life of the patent if it can win on the merits without buying off a challenger. However, the pioneer faces much more significant downside risks
than does the generic. The patent could be declared invalid, a decision
that could have a collateral estoppel effect in challenges by later
generics. A settlement with the first challenger will avoid this risk, and
under the applicable rules, it will block entry by later generics until 180
days after the first generic actually enters. Therefore, the pioneer has a

17. Id.
18. If the patentee does not sue within the time period, it does not waive its claims; instead, it

does not get the automatic stay. Id.
19. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
20. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *63 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)).
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powerful incentive to pay off the first generic challenger in return for its
delayed entry, just as the generic has a powerful incentive to accept.
All of this may be of limited public concern except for the fact that
the overarching objective of Hatch-Waxman was to speed the entry of
generic drugs, a policy that was reaffirmed in 2003.21 It is simply impossible to read the story of the multiple blockades erected as a result of the
settlement in Tamoxifen 22 and conclude that this is the litigation model
Congress contemplated. Broad judicial tolerance of reverse payments
will simply convert Hatch-Waxman into a facilitating vehicle for generics to collect a species of "greenmail.,, 23 In fact, because Hatch-Waxman
settlements can block later generic challenges, there is some potential for
collusive litigation between the pioneer and a generic that is complaisant
from the start.

III. CRITIQUE OF THE TAMOXiFEN OPINION
It may be that the bottom-line decision in Tamoxifen is correct
because it appears ex post that the patent is valid, and in the absence of
an infringement dispute, the patentee was entitled to its patent monopoly
for the full term. If, however, the question is antitrust legality before the
patent issues have been conclusively decided, the settlement appears in a
very different light. Even the Tamoxifen majority views the settlement as
"suspicious, ' 24 but the majority also seems to believe that it had no realistic alternatives. Perhaps the best way to test that conclusion is to track
some of the decision points in the opinion to see whether there were
alternatives that would be more consistent with the objectives of the
underlying statute.
A. The Structure of the Opinion
The Tamoxifen opinion first emphasizes the legality of the settlement agreement at the time it was signed and concludes with a brief
discussion of subsequent events that also undercut a claim for damages.
As suggested earlier, it would have been relatively economical and uncontroversial for the majority to say that intervening decisions about patent validity were fatal to the damage claim; therefore, it did not need to

21. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, §§ 11121118, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West Supp.
2006)).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 56-60.
23. It is not at all surprising that the Generic Pharmaceutical Association supported the legality
of these payments in Schering. See In re Schering, 402 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
24. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208.
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consider the legality of the settlement agreement.25 The opinion obviously took the long route to send a message to be applied in future
cases. 26 That the opinion recognizes the existence of difficult choices
also makes Tamoxifen a more interesting subject for analysis than the
cursory conclusions of the Eleventh Circuit in Schering.2 7
B. Apparently Obvious Statements with Underlying Complexities
The Tamoxifen opinion begins with a series of propositions that are
non-controversial on the surface but which may gloss over some underlying complexities.
First, the court states: "We begin our analysis against the backdrop
of our longstanding adherence to the principle that 'courts are bound to
encourage' the settlement of litigation.,

28

It is hard to quarrel with this

general proposition, and this policy perhaps has special force in the context of patent litigation. When it comes to litigation under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, Congress has chosen to put its thumb on
the scale. To facilitate the introduction of generic substitutes, HatchWaxman seeks to encourage patent challenges, and reverse payments
make it very easy for the litigating parties to thwart that underlying
objective."
While the plain language of the Hatch-Waxman Act does not outline the permissible parameters of pioneer-generic settlements, it does
establish certain procedures for the conduct of pioneer-generic litigation
in aid of clear objectives. Because agreements to defer generic entry
plainly would be per se illegal, absent this litigation context, the Commission in Schering attempted to give appropriate deference to congressional policy expressed in the original Hatch-Waxman Act.3 ° The
25. See discussion supra Part II.A.
26. This is not uncommon. The Commission's own opinion in Schering expressed views on the
legality of reverse payments, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *6067 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003), followed by a detailed factual inquiry into whether there was a reverse
payment in the first place, id. at *89-169. The idea was to separate general principles from some
case-specific facts.
27. It is hard for me to view Schering dispassionately, but I cannot escape the conclusion that
the opinion is driven by the court's erroneous belief that a challenger bears the burden on the issue of
infringement as well as the issue of validity. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 106667 (1 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
28. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202 (quoting Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143
(2d Cir. 2004)).
29. As the court stated in dicta in In re Ciprofloxacin HydrochlorideAntitrust Litigation, 261
F. Supp. 2d 188, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), "the challenged agreements allowed [the generic] to accept
cash in exchange for an agreement to halt the process . . . encouraged by the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments and beneficial to consumers."
30. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
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Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
200331 is even more explicit about settlements. In that statute, Congress
gave the Commission special responsibilities for review of pioneergeneric settlements,32 after the Commission's jaundiced views on reverse
payments were well known. Given this history, it is hard to argue that
Congress wanted the Commission merely to apply the standard hornbook
principle that settlements are prohibited if and only if they restrict entry
beyond the time or the coverage of a patent. 33 Therefore, although a general policy in favor of settlements remains viable, and perhaps imperative
in many contexts, Hatch-Waxman settlements are different.
Second, another facially uncontroversial statement with trouble
brewing underneath is the observation that, when determining legality, it
is necessary to look at the world as it existed at the time of settlement.34
This position makes sense because parties who contemplate settlement
are entitled to some certainty. However, the Tamoxifen court does not
address the more controversial question of whether and how a court
should examine the subjective expectations of the settling parties
themselves, as part of that determination.
For example, is it necessary to find out how optimistic or pessimistic the settling parties were about their litigation chances? This would be
a problematic exercise. For good reason, other areas of antitrust law tend
to downplay the importance of subjective indicia of "intent." The evidence may be of even more limited relevance in the present context.
There are the standard objections that intent evidence may be manipulated and that because a corporation has a large number of actors, each
with his own "intent," it is artificial to attribute subjective intent to the
entity as a whole. Moreover, when it comes to litigation settlements, the
best evidence on subjective views about litigation prospects is likely to
be contained in privileged communications.35
Finally, absent evidence that one party or another viewed its own
claim as a sham, it would be unclear how to use such evidence, even if it
were available. Take the simplest possible case, where each party evaluates its chances of success at 50/50. If the Tamoxifen court is right and

31. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-64 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West Supp.

2006)). See also S. REP. No. 107-167, at 4 (2002) (referencing the "abuse of the Hatch-Waxman
law").
32. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 §§ 1112-1118.
33. Contra Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13.
34. See id. at 203-04.
35. In Schering, there was some record evidence that indicated both Schering and UpsherSmith, the generic challenger, expected generic entry promptly upon expiration of the thirty month
automatic stay. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *47-55
(F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003).
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reverse payments are essentially per se legal when entry restrictions are
limited to the scope of the patent, then such evidence adds nothing. If the
Tamoxifen court is wrong and reverse payments are suspect, it is also
unhelpful. For example, we cannot conclude that the only reasonable
settlement would be one that provides for generic entry halfway along
the remaining patent life because the individual parties may have very
different risk tolerances.
Another possibility would be for the antitrust court itself to undertake a mini-trial on the merits of the underlying patent claim to decide
whether particular settlement terms would likely result in competitive
harm. The question of whether such a mini-trial is necessary is linked to
the issue of how to take appropriate account of the preclusive power of a
patent.
IV. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A PATENT
The Tamoxifen and Schering courts relied on the presumptive validity of a patent to support the conclusion that any settlement that does not
exceed the exclusionary scope of a patent must also be valid. Within
these parameters, both decisions find that a patentee can pay whatever it
takes to buy off a potential challenger. Apparently, an antitrust court cannot declare such a settlement illegal-at least without its own inquiry
into the merits of the patent case. No shortcuts are possible. We now
consider, first, whether this principle should be applied to settlements
where patent infringement is an issue and, second, whether the principle
should be modified in validity disputes under Hatch-Waxman
procedures.
A. The Infringement Issue
The Eleventh Circuit premised its Schering opinion on the fundamentally mistaken notion that the generic challenger has the burden of
proof on both the issue of infringement and the issue of validity.3 6 If this
were the law, one could argue for the default assumption that a patentee
has a right to exclude, bounded only by the term and scope of its patent.
But, this is not the law. 37 Because infringement was an issue between the
parties to the settlement in Schering, the Commission found that it was

36. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) ("Schering obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market until they proved either that the ... [relevant] patent was invalid or that their products ... did not
infringe Schering's patent.").
37. It is clear that a patentee has the burden of proof on the issue of infringement. See, e.g.,
Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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impossible to make any initial assumptions about the preclusive power of
a patent.38
The Commission did, however, rely on the special characteristics of
patent litigation when it declined to apply the Sixth Circuit's per se condemnation of reverse payments.39 Ordinarily, it would be as per se illegal for an incumbent to pay a potential competitor for delayed entry as it
would be to compensate the competitor for a permanent commitment to
stay out of the market. However, when the incumbent is a patentee that
might ultimately have been able to establish its right to exclude a generic
competitor, the Commission was, and is, willing to entertain some justifications for a payment not to compete. This is still a long way from saying that the payments are essentially per se legal if the non-compete
agreement does not delay entry beyond expiration of the patent.
The Commission emphasized that infringement was an important
issue in the Schering case. 40 A case without the infringement issue may
be different because of the presumption of patent validity. Some controversy exists about the appropriate strength of that presumption today
given the problems that some perceive in the patent approval process. 41
However, in Schering, the Commission was not driven by any view on
the appropriate global balance between the domains of patent law and
antitrust law. Rather, the Commission was affected by an appreciation of
what Congress was trying to accomplish in Hatch-Waxman.
B. The Validity Issue
Given the default assumption that a patent is valid, how should a
court approach a settlement when validity is the only issue? It may be
necessary for an antitrust tribunal to examine the merits of the patent
case to determine whether a private party has been injured. However, it is
not necessarily efficient to require it when the Commission reviews settlements pursuant to its congressional mandate 42 or when a court reviews
a prosecutor's action. Some problems with this approach are outlined in
the Commission's Schering opinion. 43 Perhaps the most significant problem is that the parties to a reverse payment settlement, with greatest
38. Schering, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *68-70 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003).

39. Id. at *69-70.
40. Id. at *74-76.
41. See, e.g., FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY
(Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/

innovationrpt.pdf.
42. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, §§ 11121118, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West Supp.
2006)).
43. Schering, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *68-79.
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access to the facts, are no longer in an adverse relationship when the settlement is challenged. Instead, they have a mutual interest in asserting
that the generic challenge was problematic from the start.44 Another
difficulty is that an ex post mini-trial on the merits would make it hard
for parties to assess the legality of their settlements ex ante.45
If a mini-trial on the merits is impractical, how should the Commission or an antitrust court look at the settlement in a case that involves
only a challenge to patent validity and where the merits of the patent
claim are unclear? The Second Circuit in Tamoxifen said simply that the
exclusion rights granted under a presumptively valid patent, coupled with
a strong public policy in favor of settlements, will immunize any settle46
ment that does not preclude competition outside the scope of the patent.
This is overly simplistic. Consider the analogy of the antitrust principles
applied to patent licenses. An argument could be made that every restriction in a patent license should be presumptively lawful. Because the patentee has a legal right to exclude all competition, even a restricted
license allows more competition than could otherwise have taken place.47
But this facially compelling argument will not immunize a patent license
that contains a price-fixing restriction.48
How can this be? The answer is that a judge-made rule has declared
certain conduct to be "so plainly anticompetitive" that it is deemed illegal per se across the board, 49 even though in a particular case it may be
less restrictive than an alternative legal arrangement. This rule can apply
when the legal alternative is a refusal to license a patent altogether, just
as it can apply in other contexts. For example, a per se illegal resale price
agreement may be less restrictive than a legal grant of an exclusive
territory.
For reasons explained in the next subsection, broad tolerance of reverse payments not only will defeat Hatch-Waxman's fundamental objective to motivate first challengers, but, even more perversely, it will
enable the settling parties to preempt subsequent generic challengers. If
the preclusive effect of a patent does not overcome a presumption against

44. Id. at *77-78.

45. Id. at *78-79.
46. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2006).

47. This argument was, in fact, enshrined in the previous version of antitrust enforcement
guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(1988), as reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13, 109, withdrawn, U.S. Dep't of Justice &
FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995), as reprintedin 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,107.
48. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 3.4 (1995), as reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 132.
49. FTC v. Superior Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,433 (1990).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 30:377

per se illegal license restrictions, the preclusive effect should not necessarily overcome a much weaker presumption against settlements that
threatens to turn the impact of Hatch-Waxman upside down.
C. Special Hatch- Waxman Arguments
The Tamoxifen court, like a number of others, seemed to accept the
proposition that reverse payments are a natural and inevitable by-product
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Additionally, the court suggested that prohibiting reverse payments would make it impossible to settle pioneergeneric patent litigation. 50 The argument is that the statute has dramatically shifted the traditional balance of power because the pioneers now
risk so much more than the generics do. The Tamoxifen court stated that
"reverse payments are particularly to be expected in the drug-patent
context because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages them." 5 1 In fact, the court went even further by suggesting that
to litigate each
without reverse payments, pioneers "would be required
' 52
threatened patent to final, unappealable judgment."
The first, and perhaps most important, response to this speculation
is that it has no factual basis. The Commission has closely monitored
pioneer-generic settlements, as Congress mandated it to do in 2003, and
it recently published a report on this activity. 53 Of fourteen pioneer-

generic, settlements filed with the Commission in fiscal year 2004, none
included a reverse payment.5 4 In fact, even before the Commission's first
enforcement action, a study found that eleven of twenty settlements with
first generic challenges did not include reverse payments. 55 Parties to
these settlements could obviously reach agreement without them. If,
however, reverse payments are routinely allowed, generics will have a
natural and inevitable incentive to sell out their claims, delay entry more
than they would otherwise, and blockade others behind them. This
already may have started to happen.56

50. Tamoxiten Litigation,466 F.3d at 212-13.

51. Id. at 206.
52.Id. at 212.
53.

See FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 2003, 2005 WL 66834 (F.T.C.) (Jan. 2005).

54. Id. at 3.
55. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 31
(2002), availableat www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Exclusion Payments to Settle
Pharmaceutical Patent Cases, They're B-a-a-a-ck!, Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum on
Pharmaceutical Antitrust (Apr. 24, 2006), available at http://www.fte.gov/speeches/leibowitz/
060424PharmaSpeechACl.pdf.
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The blockade of other generics has significant effects, and deserves
some elaboration. As the Tamoxifen court pointed out, a change in FDA
rules has given the first generic challenger a 180-day exclusivity period
from the date of its own entry, regardless of whether it has successfully
defended the pioneer's infringement action. Thus, to the extent that the
reverse payment results in later entry by the first challenger than would
have occurred, subsequent generic challengers are held up as well. The
Tamoxifen court is correct that it is not an antitrust offense, standing
alone, for the first generic to take advantage of the exclusivity granted by
the FDA rule. However, in a case where a court must look at the likely
competitive harm ex ante, rather than damages ex post, it would be appropriate to consider that the settlement delays entry not only by the first
generic but also by subsequent challengers.
Consider, for example, the rough analogy of an import restriction,
referred to earlier in another context. 58 It does not violate the antitrust
laws if a company takes advantage of import restrictions imposed by
trade laws. Nevertheless, if a company is contemplating a merger in an
industry with import restrictions, the existence of the restrictions will
affect the analysis of market shares and likely competitive effects.59
Obviously, the FDA rule change that made it easier for the first generic to earn 180-day exclusivity was designed to provide another incentive for the first generic to step up to the challenge. But the rule change
has also conferred a benefit on the pioneer. Later challengers are blockaded, in all likelihood for at least thirty months and potentially a great
deal longer, if settlements like that in Tamoxifen are tolerated. After the
pioneer settles with the first challenger for an extended entry delay, it can
safely ignore the threat of additional generic entry.6 °
Notwithstanding these offsetting advantages, it may well be true
that Hatch-Waxman benefits generics much more than pioneers because
generics' litigation risks are so much less. However, Congress has the
right to modify the parties' traditional bargaining power as it chooses and
for ends that it deems appropriate. The decision to change the traditional
balance of bargaining power is a political one within the purview of
elected officials. The change may mean that pioneers will need to settle
for earlier generic entry than they would otherwise, but it is really not
57. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2006).
58. See discussion supra Part II.A.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, DOJ & FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.43
(1992), reprinted in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS app. C at
1491-92 (5th ed. 2002).

60. Declaratory judgments are unavailable to these additional generic challengers if the pioneer
simply does not threaten to sue. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 473 (2005).
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relevant whether people in agencies or on the bench think this is a good
idea.
Courts also tend to forget that parties who do not want to play by
Hatch-Waxman rules can still choose to play by the old rules. A pioneer
that wants to force generic challengers to accept the traditional litigation
risks does not need to challenge the generic's certification within the
statute's forty-five day period. Rather, it can simply wait for a generic to
enter before it files suit. While the pioneer gives up an automatic thirty
month stay, it does have the potential to collect crushing damages, measured by its own lost profits rather than the undoubtedly smaller profits of
the generic. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that a pioneer that chooses
to accept the benefits of the law cannot thereafter undercut the objectives
of the law by buying off the generic challenger. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that a generic that has chosen to avail itself of the advantages conferred by Hatch-Waxman does not have an unbounded right
to sell out for a share of the pioneer's profits at consumers' expense.
V. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE
COMMISSION'S APPROACH IN SCHERING

61
The Tamoxifen court was "not unaware of a troubling dynamic"
associated with the conduct that it chose to uphold as a matter of law but
seemed strangely convinced (despite contrary facts) that any alternative
rule would "outlaw all, or nearly all, settlements of Hatch-Waxman infringement actions." 62 Even the dissent was unable to come up with an
approach other than an open-ended rule of reason inquiry, "weighing
various factors including the strength of the patent as it appeared at the
time of the settlement. ' 63 It is strange that neither the majority nor the
dissent was even willing to consider a more practical alternative. It is
64
demonstrably false that reverse payments are essential for settlement,
so per se legality is not the only available option. Nevertheless, no one
outside the academic world seems to agree with the practical alternatives
that the Commission set out in Schering. However, that does not mean
the Commission's approach in Schering was wrong. The advantages of
that approach may be summarized briefly as follows.
Reverse payments are not per se illegal, but they do raise serious issues in the Hatch-Waxman context. It is difficult to come up with an
appropriate shorthand expression to describe reverse payments. The term
inherently suspect that is used in other contexts does not quite fit because

61. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211.
62.Id.at 212.
63. Id. at 225 n.3 (Pooler, J.,
dissenting).

64. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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that term suggests a focus on the nature of the conduct rather than the
nature of the market.6 5 The suspicion of reverse payments arises out of a
special market characteristic, namely the economic fact that generics can
earn more by an agreement to defer their entry into the market than they
could earn by winning their patent challenge and competing in the market. Moreover, the pioneers have a powerful incentive to pay generics
something more than they would earn by entry because the sum is still
less than the amount the pioneer would lose if the generic did enter. If
this is allowed as a matter of course, then settlement can defer entry for
the entire remaining patent life, and Hatch-Waxman is a dead letter.
On the other hand, the Commission did recognize that most cases
will settle and that parties need some practical guidance on ways to do it.
Therefore, the Commission stated that it would not attack a settlement
that merely provided for some entry between the settlement date and the
date of patent expiration. 66 The idea is that an agreed-on split is likely to
reflect a compromise of each party's individual litigation expectations. If
these litigation expectations have been affected by the special HatchWaxman procedures, so be it.
It is true that reverse payments may resemble other deals that accommodate a generic challenger. The Tamoxifen court, for example,
questioned whether there was any distinction between a reverse payment
and a more traditional settlement, 67 which might include a reduced royalty or a compromise on damages. But unlike a reverse payment, neither
of these alternatives has the potential to offer greater rewards in settlement than can be obtained by outright victory. In any event, the Commission's Schering opinion did not need to address either alternative.
It is also possible that a reverse payment could enable a generic to
compete more effectively after the additional delay. The Commission
acknowledged that there might be a so-called "cash-starved" generic justification.68 Moreover, the Commission recognized that litigation is
expensive and that a pioneer may be willing to avoid the nuisance of a
69
lawsuit. The proposed order was intended to recognize this reality.

65. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *37-38 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)
("[T]he facts of this case require us to look beyond the nature of the challenged restraint and con-

sider the nature of the market.").
66. Id. at *78 ("Under the standard we adopt here, if the parties simply compromise on the

entry date, standing alone, they do not need to worry about a later antitrust attack.").
67. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 207 n.20 (2d Cir. 2006).
68. See Schering, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *83, in which the Commission acknowledged that

up-front support to a "cash starved" generic could have "competitive benefits" but also pointed out
that the issue of financial need had been waived.
69. As explained in Schering, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187, at *184-85, the order prohibited reverse
payments generally, but provided an exception for litigation costs up to $2 million. An order which
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These, and perhaps other justifications, explain why the Commission was
not willing to say that reverse payments are per se illegal. Nevertheless,
it is obvious that the per se legality rule, which the Second Circuit
adopted, is not the only alternative. Here, as in so many other areas,
always is not the only alternative to never.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Commission essentially got things right in Schering, notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's abrupt reversal and the Second Circuit's
more considered, but still flawed, treatment of the issues in Tamoxifen.
The question becomes, what happens now?
Public statements of individual commissioners and public testimony authorized by the Commission as a body suggest that the agency
has not reversed its position.7 0 There is a sharp split in the circuits: two
circuits clearly oppose the Commission's view; 7' one would likely
tolerate it; 72 and the rest are uncertain. Thus, the Commission can forum
shop if it is willing to give up the advantage of administrative litigation
and proceed directly in a federal court.73 And, of course, so can private
plaintiffs.
Other options are also available. The Commission might decide to
proceed administratively against a reverse payment settlement where
there are objective indications that the patent claims are weak. If a violation were found, it would likely be appealed to a previously unsympathetic circuit, but the case could test the outer limits of that circuit's
toleration for reverse payment settlements. Another alternative for the
Commission might be efforts to seek legislative clarification.
The Commission has not yet signaled what it intends to do, and this
uncertainty complicates the job of those who advise pharmaceutical
companies in Hatch-Waxman litigation today. It may not be easy for an
antitrust advisor to advocate caution when the recent trend of judicial
decisions seems favorable to reverse payment settlements and when they
appear to be increasingly common.

"fences in" the future conduct of a wrongdoer does not necessarily establish a rule of law for everyone, so the $2 million should not be interpreted as an upside limit.
70. See, e.g., FTC, BARRIERS TO GENERIC ENTRY (2006) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Com-

missioner, before the S. Special Comm. on Aging), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/
P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.pdf.
71. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
72. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
73. From the Commission's standpoint, the comparative advantages of the administrative process are less apparent in follow-on cases than in a case of first impression like Schering.
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But, litigation risks continue. Pharmaceutical companies might
have been better served if the Supreme Court had decided to hear the
Schering appeal, although it is understandable if some of the companies
disagree. In any event, antitrust consequences of reverse payments will
remain in doubt until the Supreme Court decides to resolve the matter, a
stronger consensus emerges in the courts of appeal, or Congress
intervenes.

